State v. Bennett Appellant\u27s Brief 2 Dckt. 34066 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
6-18-2009
State v. Bennett Appellant's Brief 2 Dckt. 34066
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Bennett Appellant's Brief 2 Dckt. 34066" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2408.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2408
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
SARA B. THOMAS 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. # 5867 
HEATHER M. CARLSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. # 7148 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 













IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
--------------------------) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
William Lynn Bennett asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the Opinion of the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2009 Opinion No. 29 (Ct. App. April 16, 2009) (hereinafter, 
Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his Judgment of Conviction, is in 
conflict with previous decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals, as well as the 
Idaho Constitution. 
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
This case is about a business transaction gone awry, leading ultimately to 
Mr. Bennett being imprisoned for an alleged breach of contract. In October 2004, 
Mr. Bennett entered into a verbal contract with Mr. LeFave to purchase Mr. LeFave's 
travel trailer. (Tr., p.28, L.12 - p.30, L.23, p.96, L.13 - p.97, L.9.)1 Mr. Bennett agreed 
to make payments to Mr. LeFave for the trailer, and Mr. LeFave agreed to bring the 
trailer to Mr. Bennett's friend's property where Mr. Bennett was going to be staying. 
(Tr., p.28, L.12 - p.30, L.23, p.96, L.13 - p.97, L.9.) Mr. Bennett made at least one 
payment toward the trailer; however, he never made full payment for the trailer.2 
(Tr., p.73, L.1 - p.75.) Mr. Bennett eventually moved to Ferndale, Washington, taking 
the travel trailer with him. (Tr., p.104, Ls.5-22.) After moving to Ferndale, Mr. Bennett 
contacted Mr. LeFave to provide him with his new information. (Tr., p.1 04, Ls.5-22.) 
Mr. LeFave subsequently contacted law enforcement to pursue criminal actions 
against Mr. Bennett and to have the trailer registered as stolen. (Tr., p.49, L.23 - p.50, 
L.15.) Mr. Bennett was charged by Information with Grand Theft for wrongfully taking 
Mr. Lafave's travel trailer on or about October 30, 2004, violating Idaho Code §§ 18-
2403(1) and 18-2407(1)(b). (R., pp.20-21.) An Information Part 1\ was subsequently 
filed by the State charging Mr. Bennett with being a persistent violator. (R., pp.32-33.) 
The case eventually proceeded to trial. 
1 For ease of reference, Mr. Bennett has cited the main transcript as "Tr.," the 
preliminary hearing transcript as "Prelim. Hr.," and the transcript of the opening and 
closing arguments as "Supp. Tr.," 
2 The number of payments and the amount outstanding was disputed at trial as 
discussed below. 
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At trial, conflicting testimony was presented regarding the terms of the sale of the 
travel trailer. Mr. LeFave testified that in 2004 he owned a 1962 travel trailer, for which 
he had paid a little under $400. (Tr., p.20, LsA-14.) He testified that when he 
purchased it, the trailer was in poor condition, but he rebuilt the inside by installing new 
paneling, building a closet, moving the cooking facilities to the back, and making it 
wheelchair accessible. (Tr., p.20, Ls.4-14, p.22, L.23 - p.23, L.2.) Mr. LeFave 
eventually decided to sell the trailer. (Tr., p.28, Ls.2-4.) Mr. LeFave testified that he 
advertised the trailer for sale at $1800. (Tr., p.28, Ls.5-11.) Mr. Bennett contacted 
Mr. LeFave to purchase the trailer, and Mr. LeFave met Mr. Bennett at the T and A 
Truck Stop to discuss the trailer and to confirm that this was where Mr. Bennett was 
working. (Tr., p.28, Ls.12-18.) According to Mr. LeFave, he agreed to sell the trailer to 
Mr. Bennett for $1,500, he agreed to tow the trailer to where Mr. Bennett would be 
staying, and he agreed that Mr. Bennett could make payments on the trailer rather than 
pay the $1,500 up front. (Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.30, L.2.) Mr. LeFave testified that after he 
towed the trailer to the specified property, he put a chain on the trailer and a "tongue 
hitch lock system," and he told Mr. Bennett "if it would be moved, I would come out and 
move it personally so I would know where it was at all times." (Tr., p.29, L.24 - p.30, 
L.6, p.30, Ls.5-17.) Under the terms of the agreement, once Mr. Bennett finished 
paying for the trailer, he would receive the title, according to Mr. LeFave. (Tr., p.30, 
Ls.20-23.) 
Mr. LeFave also testified that Mr. Bennett was not even required to make a down 
payment at the time Mr. Bennett received the trailer, instead he told Mr. Bennett "We'll 
just work on a few months to let you get build up, then we'll do it." (Tr., p.29, Ls.4-12.) 
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Mr. LeFave testified that during the course of his dealing with Mr. Bennett, he never 
received any payments from Mr. Bennett, although Mr. LeFave's wife had received one 
payment. (Tr., p.31, Ls.9-16.)3 His wife later testified that Mr. Bennett came to her 
place of work and made a payment for an uncertain amount, possibly $200-$300. 
(Tr., p.73, L.1 - p.75, L.9.) Mrs. LeFave also testified that she was present when the 
agreement was originally entered into at the T and A Truck Stop, but she could not 
remember if any money was exchanged at that time or the terms of the agreement. 
(Tr., p.75, L.25 - p.77, L.20.) 
According to Mr. LeFave, he became aware the trailer had been moved when he 
received a phone call from "Mike or Mike's wife"4 stating the trailer was not there 
anymore. (Tr., p.31, Ls.7-12.) Mr. LeFave went to the lot to investigate, looked over the 
fence from the outside, did not see the trailer, and then "went home and proceeded to 
take the legal means into it." (Tr., p.32, Ls.15-17l According to Mr. LeFave, several 
months later he received a phone call from Mr. Bennett stating if he sent him the title, he 
would send him $1,000 and "[i]f I got the police involved, he would burn it." (Tr., p.33, 
L.5 - p.34, L.3.) After contacting law enforcement, Mr. LeFave decided to send 
Mr. Bennett a certified letter telling him to send the cash first and then he would send 
3 At the preliminary hearing, Mr. LeFave testified that he had never received any 
payments from Mr. Bennett, never mentioning the payment to Mr. LeFave's wife. 
(Tr., p.58, L.11-p.66, LA; Prelim. Hr. Tr., p.11, L.5-p.12, L.5.) 
4 It is not clear from the testimony at trial, who exactly "Mike" is, although no objection 
was ever raised to referencing his name and the State never asked any questions to 
clarify the identity. 
5 Notably, this testimony is contradictory to Mr. LeFave's testimony a few moments later 
at trial when he testified that he and "Mike" went into the backyard to look around and 
found the upper part of the lock system he placed on the hitch. (Tr., p.32, L.21 - p.33, 
L.2.) This is also contradictory to Mr. LeFave's later testimony that Mr. Bennett called 
him several months later asking for the title and, after that call, Mr. LeFave pursued 
criminal charges. (Tr., p.33, L.5 - p.34, L.3.) 
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the title. (Tr., p.34, Ls.5-8l He determined what information needed to go into the 
letter after contacting Officer Jones in reference to the travel trailer. (Tr., p.49, L.23 -
p.50, L.16/ Mr. LeFave also testified that he knew where to send the letter because 
Mr. Bennett had given Mr. LeFave his address over the phone when he had called. 
(Tr., p.46, L.19 - p.47, L.7.) Unfortunately, Mr. Bennett never received this letter 
because it was returned to Mr. LeFave stating it had not been picked up, possibly 
because it was addressed to "Mr. Betten" or "Mr. Bittin" rather than Mr. Bennett. 
(Tr., p.34, Ls.5-20, p.36, LS.16-23, p.47, Ls.21-22; State's Exhibit 2; State's Exhibit 3.) 
According to Mr. LeFave he also traveled with "Mike" to the address on the letter and 
discovered that Mr. Bennett was no longer at the address. (Tr., p.37, Ls.11-19.) 
At trial Carolyn Ellinger confirmed that she had allowed Mr. Bennett to park the 
travel trailer on her property in October/November 2004. (Tr., p.82, Ls.16-23.) She 
testified that although the trailer was chained to a fence it was not locked. (Tr., p.83, 
Ls.8-16.) Ms. Ellinger testified that a couple months later, Mr. Bennett advised 
Ms. Ellinger that he would be moving. (Tr., p.83, L.24 - p.84, L.12.) He had obtained a 
second job helping a handicapped person and he would be living there with the trailer 
6 The actual letter allegedly sent made no mention of exchanging money for the title, 
stating only "This letter serves notice that 10 days after receipt, MY trailer vin 
A98323478 will be entered N.C.I.C. as a stolen vehicle! If you have any Questions you 
can contact Officer Jones with the Boise Police Department." (State's Exhibit 3.) 
Notably, there were actually two letters contained in State's Exhibit 3 with very similar 
language, one of which was allegedly sent to Mr. Bennett (or Betten, as the envelope 
was addressed). (State's Exhibit 2; State's Exhibit 3.) Mr. LeFave testified that he 
could not remember which of the two letters were actually sent to Mr. Bennett. (Tr., 
p.35, Ls.16-23.) Because the language is almost identical and the exhibit was admitted 
without objection, counsel on appeal, has quoted the language from the first letter. 
~State's Exhibit 3; See Tr., p.36, Ls.9-13.) 
The demand letter, which purports to reference the VIN #, actually references the title 
number A98323478. (State's Exhibit 1; State's Exhibit 3; Tr., p.53, Ls.3-24.) 
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(Tr., p.83, L.24 - p.84, L.7.) Later that evening, Mr. Bennett and the trailer were gone. 
(Tr., p.84, Ls.9-12.) 
At trial, Mr. Bennett testified that the sign on the trailer advertised the price as 
$1000 and that he had agreed to pay Mr. LeFave $8S0 for it. (Tr., p.96, Ls.13-20.) 
Mr. Bennett paid $1S0 on the day the transaction was entered into and he made 
payments every two weeks after that when he received his check. (Tr., p.97, Ls.1-9.) 
Mr. Bennett testified that he made payments of $1S0 on 11/1/2004 and $300 on 
11/1S/04 to Mr. LeFave at the truck stop, and $1S0 on 11/17/04 to Mrs. LeFave at her 
place of work. (Tr., p.98, Ls.1S-20, p.99, L 14 - p.100, L.6, p.100, L.23 - p.101, L.2S.) 
Mr. Bennett testified that when he made the last payment to Mrs. LeFave, she said the 
title had been ordered and it was agreed when the title came in he would make the final 
payment in exchange for the title. (Tr., p.102, Ls.11-2S.) Mr. Bennett also testified that 
when he started his second job, Mr. LeFave moved the trailer for him from Ms. Ellinger's 
property to the new location where he would be working and Mr. Bennett advised him at 
that time he might be moving again. (Tr., p.110, L.18 - p.111, L.16.) Finally, 
Mr. Bennett testified that when he moved to Ferndale, Washington, he contacted 
Mr. LeFave with his address and inquired again about the title. (Tr., p.104, Ls.S-22.) 
Mr. Bennett was ultimately convicted by the jury of grand theft and stipulated that 
he was a persistent violator. (Tr., p.14S, LA - p.149, L.12; R, pp.46, SO.) Mr. Bennett 
filed a pro se Notice of Appeal following the jury's verdict. (R, pp.S1-S7.) Counsel for 
Mr. Bennett also filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal arguing that "[t]he inculpatory 
evidence presented on the material element of value was so insubstantial that jurors 
could not help but have a reasonable doubt as to the proof of that element." (R, pp.S8-
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59, 62-64.) At the hearing on the motion, counsel for Mr. Bennett argued that because 
of the inconsistencies in Mr. LeFave's testimony and the fact that Mr. LeFave admitted 
his memory of the events was only about 85%, there was insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate the value of the trailer. (Tr., p.154, L.12 - p.160, L.23l The district court 
took the matter under advisement and issued a Memorandum Decision on Defendant's 
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, denying the motion. (Tr., p.160, L.24 - p.161, L.4; R., 
pp.65-70.) 
Mr. Bennett was eventually sentenced to concurrent sentences of eight years, 
with one and a half years fixed, for grand theft and for being a persistent violator. 
(R., pp.75-77l Mr. Bennett then filed a timely pro se Amended Notice of Appeal and 
Notice of Appeal from the district court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.79-89.) 
Mr. Bennett also filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion 
requesting his sentence be reduced to three years, with one a half years fixed. 
(R., pp.91-110.) The district court denied Mr. Bennett's Rule 35 request. (R., pp.111-
114.) 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Bennett argued that the State failed to provide 
sufficient evidence that he was guilty of grand theft because it failed to demonstrate that 
Mr. Bennett unlawfully took the property, that Mr. LeFave owned the trailer when it was 
allegedly stolen, and that Mr. Bennett possessed the requisite intent to deprive the 
8 Because this Court will not substitute its views regarding the credibility of witness and 
the weight of the evidence on appeal, and this would be a question of fact regarding the 
jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and weight of the evidence, this issue is 
not being pursued on appeal. State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 595, 944 P.2d 727, 
730 (Ct. App. 1997). 
9 This has subsequently been corrected by the department of corrections to properly 
reflect one sentence. 
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owner of the trailer or appropriate the trailer. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-17.) Mr. Bennett 
also argued that the district court erred when it ordered a separate concurrent sentence 
for the persistent violator enhancement. 1O (Appellant's Brief, pp.17-18.) The Idaho 
Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Bennett's conviction, finding their was sufficient evidence 
to sustain his conviction for grand theft that that a correction to his sentence should be 
pursued in the district court below. (See Opinion general/y.) Mr. Bennett filed a timely 
Petition for Review. 
10 This issue is not being pursued in Mr. Bennett's Petition for Review. 
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ISSUE 
Should Mr. Bennett's Petition for Review be granted because the Idaho Court of 
Appeals' Opinion affirming his Judgment of Conviction is in conflict with previous 
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals, as well as the 
Idaho State Constitution? 
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ARGUMENT 
Mr. Bennett's Petition For Review Should Be Granted Because The Idaho Court Of 
Appeals' Opinion Affirming His Judgment Of In Conflict With Previous Decisions Of The 
Idaho Supreme Court And The Idaho Court Of Appeals, As Well As The Idaho State 
Constitution 
A. Introduction 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion finding that there was sufficient evidence to 
sustain Mr. Bennett's criminal conviction for his failure to pay Mr. LeFave the full amount 
for his trailer is contrary to prior opinions by this Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals 
as well as article I, section 15 of the Idaho State Constitution. Therefore, he asks this 
Court to grant his Petition for Review, and if granted, to find there was not sufficient 
evidence presented to convict him of criminal grand theft. 
B. Standard Of Review For Petition For Review 
Idaho Appellate Rule 118(b) provides that, "[g]ranting a petition for review from a 
final decision of the Court of Appeals is discretionary on the part of the Supreme Court, 
and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons .... " Among the 
factors to be considered is whether the Opinion is in conflict with a previous decision of 
either the Idaho Supreme Court or the Idaho Court of Appeals. I.A.R. 118(b)(1)-(3). 
C. Mr. Bennett's Petition For Review Should Be Granted Because The Idaho Court 
Of Appeals' Opinion Is In Conflict With Previous Decisions Of This Court And 
The Idaho Court Of Appeals As Well As The Idaho State Constitution 
In affirming Mr. Bennett's conviction, the Idaho Court of Appeals found that there 
was sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Bennett for his removal of the trailer in question 
prior to finishing payment under the contract. In reaching this decision, the court found 
that 1) Mr. Bennett's conviction did not run afoul of the article I, section 15 of the Idaho 
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Constitution prohibition on incarceration for the failure to pay a debt; 2) that Mr. Bennett 
wrongfully took the property when he removed the trailer from the Ellingers' property 
without Mr. LeFave's permission; 3) that Mr. LeFave was the "owner" of the trailer 
because he retained the physical title and sole control over the location of the trailer, 
and therefore, by moving the trailer Mr. Bennett took property from the owner; and 4) 
that Mr. Bennett took the trailer with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the 
property because Mr. Bennett was not the owner. (Opinion, pp.4-9.) 
Mr. Bennett contends the Court of Appeals' Opinion is in conflict with the Idaho 
State Constitution as well as previous decisions of this Court and the Idaho Court of 
Appeals in several aspects. First, Mr. Bennett contends that his conviction does run 
afoul of the Idaho State constitutional provision prohibiting imprisonment for the failure 
to pay a debt contrary to the Court of Appeals' holding otherwise. Additionally, he 
contends that the Court of Appeals' finding that Mr. Bennett was only granted limited 
possession; therefore, grand theft exceeded the scope of that possession and took the 
trailer is contradictory to prior Court of Appeals case law as well as the charge of grand 
theft itself. He also contends that the Court of Appeals' finding that there was sufficient 
evidence that Mr. LeFave's ownership interest was superior to that of Mr. Bennett's is 
contrary to opinions by both this Court and the Court of Appeals. Finally, he contends 
the Court of Appeals finding that he intentionally deprived the owner of the trailer of the 
property is also contrary to prior opinions by this Court. 
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1. Mr. Bennett's Conviction Runs Afoul Of The Idaho Constitutional Provision 
Prohibiting Imprisonment For The Failure To Pay A Debt 
In analyzing whether Mr. Bennett wrongfully took possession of the trailer, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals found that the jury's verdict in this case did not run afoul of the 
Idaho Constitutional provision prohibiting criminal enforcement of contractual 
obligations. (Opinion, p.7.) However, Mr. Bennett was not charged with any type of 
fraudulent theft involving misrepresentation or misappropriation of the property, but was 
charged with general theft for moving the trailer before making all of the payments, this 
is in conflict with article 1, section 15 of the Idaho Constitution which prohibits the failure 
to pay a debt except in cases of fraud. Therefore, contrary to the Court of Appeals' 
finding, Mr. Bennett was charged and convicted of theft for his failure to fulfill his 
contractual obligations, which is what article I, section 15 of the Idaho Constitution was 
designed to prevent. 
In the context of criminal actions arising out of contractual obligations, there has 
evolved a tradition against enforcing civil contractual obligations through criminal 
proceedings. State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 50, 501 P.2d 727, 734 (1972); State v. 
Henninger, 130 Idaho 638,642,945 P.2d 864, 868 (Ct. App. 1997). This is reflected in 
article I, section 15, of the Idaho State Constitution, which prohibits the "imprisonment 
for debt in this state except in cases of fraud." Idaho Const. art I, § 15. The reasons 
underlying this tradition include "the improbability of preventing honest insolvency by 
threat of prosecution, the danger of discouraging healthy commercial risk-taking or of 
obtaining unjust convictions by hindsight, the futility of imprisoning a debtor unable to 
pay, and the concept that the seller or lender must select and accept his risks." Jesser, 
95 Idaho at 50,501 P.2d at 734; Henninger, 130 Idaho at 642,945 P.2d at 868. 
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Although, at one time, imprisonment for failure to pay a debt was an acceptable 
"private civil remedy," as explained by the South Dakota Supreme Court, it quickly 
became disfavored in the nineteen century. State v. Allison, 607 N.W.2d 1, 3 (S.D. 
2000). By 1853, the United State's Supreme Court stated: 
Imprisonment for debt is a relic of ancient barbarism. It has 
descended with the stream of time. It is a punishment rather than a 
remedy. It is a right for fraud, but wrong for misfortune. It breaks the spirit 
of the honest debtor, destroys his credit, which is a form of capital, and 
dooms him, while it lasts, to helpless idleness. Where there is no fraud, it 
is the opposite of a remedy. Every right-minded man must rejoice when 
such a blot is removed from the statute-book. 
Id. (quoting Magniac v. Thomson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 281, 302 (1853)). Today, 
imprisonment for the failure to pay a debt is often forbidden by state constitutional 
provisions like article I, section 15. Id. Such provisions are designed to protect the 
debtor who cannot pay from imprisonment, but also allow for the prosecution of those 
who act fraudulently or dishonestly. Id. (quoting State v. Madewell, 309 A.2d 201, 204 
(1973)). Therefore, historically, courts have been reluctant to apply criminal culpability 
to a civil breach of a contract. See State v. Hersch, 445 N.W.2d 626, 633 n.10 (N.D. 
1989) (stating that a false promise may not be inferred merely from nonperformance of 
a promise because "the crime of theft of property was not intended as a substitute for a 
breach of contract suit.") (citing Coment on Theft of Property Offenses: § 1731-1741, 
Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Vol 
2, p.925 (1970)); Wojahn v. Halder, 39 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 1949) (noting that although 
imprisonment for debt is forbidden by the Minnesota State constitution, imprisonment for 
fraud in contracting a debt was acceptable stating "[t]he imprisonment in such case is 
for the fraud and not for the debt"); State v. Ripley, 889 SO.2d 1214 (La. Ct. App. 2nd Cir. 
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2004) (stating "[t]his case is essentially a civil breach of contract case arising out of the 
failure to pay rent. It is paramount that criminal intent, one of the several essential 
elements the state must prove for the crime of theft, be clearly established by the 
evidence" when finding the evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant's 
conviction); State v. Amanns, 2 S.W.3d 241 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (finding although the 
evidence presented by the State established a breach of contract, the defendant's 
conduct failed "to establish the commission of any offense recognized under our general 
theft statute."); Evans v. State, 508 So.2d 1205 (Ala. ct. App. 1987) (recognizing that 
although the defendant's conduct constituted a breach of contract, it did not constitute 
the crime of theft by deception). See also Commonweatlh v. Hensley, 375 S.E.2d 182 
(Va. Ct. App. 1988) ("[W]hile there was no explicit proscription in Virginia's Constitution 
against imprisonment for debt, it nevertheless was clear that a person could not be 
imprisoned, absent fraud, for mere failure to pay a debt arising from a contract."); 
People v. Ryan, 363 N.E. 2d 334, 337 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977) (cautioning against 
expanding the scope of criminal liability for larceny by false pretenses because there 
was always a danger that the crime could reach into the civil realm of a mere breach of 
contract and stating, "the inference of intent must overcome to a moral certainty an 
implication of mere civil wrong.") 
Much like under the Idaho Constitution, under the Washington State Constitution, 
"one cannot be imprisoned merely for failure to pay a debt," although it is acceptable to 
imprison for fraud. State v. Pike, 826 P.2d 152, 157 (Wash. 1992). In State v. Pike, the 
Washington Supreme Court stated that "general contractual debt cannot support a theft 
conviction" noting that "[w]e are loath to turn the criminal justice system into a 
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mechanism for the collection of private debts." Id. See also State v. Sloan, 903 P.2d 
522 (Wash. App. Div 3 1995) ("[8]reach of contract without more does not support 
criminal liability."). 
In Louisiana, the courts have specifically held that "a defendant lacks the 
requisite intent [to commit theft] when he makes an effort to pay the victim or to honor a 
promise made to him." State v. Saucier, 485 So.2d 584, 585 (La. App. 1986.) In 
Saucier, the defendant had been given the victim's dog to breed. Id. When it became 
apparent that no dogs would be bred, she stated that she would pay for the dog, but 
never actually paid. Id. She asserted that by attempting to breed the dog, she 
established that she intended to fulfill her obligations and that her failure to pay may 
give rise to a civil suit for breach of contract, but was not criminal theft. Id. The 
Louisiana Court of Appeals agreed. Id. 
Similarly, in Cox v. State, 658 S.W.2d 668 (Tx. App. 1983), the Texas Court of 
Appeals also found that the evidence established nothing more than a contract dispute 
stating, "[t]he mere fact that one fails to return or pay back money after failing to perform 
a contract, for the performance of which the money was paid in advance, does not 
constitute theft." Id. at 671. In Cox, the alleged victim contracted with the defendant to 
have some home repair work done, paying the defendant in advance for parts and 
services. Id. at 669-670. The alleged victim admitted that the defendant performed "a 
great deal of the services" he said he WOUld, but did not complete the job or return any 
of the money. Id. at 670. The court found that "the evidence in the present case 
established no more than a dispute over appellant's performance of a kitchen 
remodeling contract." Id. at 671. The court went on to find that the State failed to 
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establish that the defendant had the intent to deprive the alleged victim at the time he 
took the money from her. Id. 
Uke many of the other states cited above, the Idaho Constitutional provision 
prohibiting imprisonment for failure to pay a debt specifically creates an exception for 
cases of fraud. See Id. Const. art I, § 15. In fact, in State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920,935 
P.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1997), the Court of Appeals was asked to determine the extent to 
which article I, section 15, of the Idaho Constitution applies when the defendant is 
charged with theft by deception and theft by false promise. Id. at 928-29, 935 P.2d at 
191-92. The Court noted that this provision "is intended to prohibit imprisonment over 
disputes which are contractual in nature." Id. at 928, 935 P.2d at 191. The Court cited 
State v. Cochrane, 51 Idaho 521,6 P.2d 489 (1931), and found that these specific types 
of theft crimes were constitutional under Cochrane where they included "a component of 
dishonesty or falsehood" and thereby "advance the state's interest in preserving 'good 
morals and honest dealing.'" Id. at 929,935 P.2d at 192 (quoting Cochrane, 51 Idaho at 
527,6 P.2d at 491.) 
Here, however, Mr. Bennett was not charged with any type of fraudulent theft 
involving misrepresentation or misappropriation of the property, but was charged with 
general theft for moving the trailer before making all of the payments. Although the 
Court of Appeals concentrated on the fact that Mr. Bennett moved the trailer without 
Mr. LeFave's permission, moving the trailer without a showing fraudulent intent or 
misappropriation of property, proves only that Mr. Bennett breached the terms of the 
contract, not that he acted criminally. (See Opinion, pp.4-9.) Therefore, contrary to the 
Court of Appeals' finding, Mr. Bennett was charged and convicted of theft for his failure 
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to fulfill his contractual obligations, which is what article I, section 15 was designed to 
prevent. 
2. Mr. Bennett Could Not Unlawfully Take The Trailer When He Moved It 
Because The Property Was Already Lawfully In His Possession 
In its Opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that "it was reasonable for the 
jury to conclude that Bennett was not granted full possession but only a right to occupy 
the trailer on Ellinger's property" and found that "Bennett's act of removing the trailer 
from Ellinger's property without LeFave's permission and without first paying for it as the 
parties had agreed constituted a wrongful taking criminalized in the theft statute, as it far 
exceeded the limited control that LeFave had granted Bennett over the property." 
(Opinion, ppA-5.) However, this finding is contrary to the Idaho Court of Appeals' 
Opinion in State v. Henninger, 130 Idaho 638, 945 P.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1997), because 
Mr. Bennett obtained possession of the trailer when Mr. LeFave dropped it off at the 
specified location and Mr. LeFave did not have a superior possessory interest in the 
trailer. 
Idaho Code section 18-2402 defines obtaining property as bringing "about a 
transfer of interest or possession, whether to the offender or to another." I.C. § 18-
2402. Mr. Bennett argued on appeal that this had already occurred lawfully when 
Mr. LeFave brought the travel trailer to the property where Mr. Bennett was living. (See 
Tr., p.29, L.24 - p.30, L.6; Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.) Once Mr. LeFave dropped off 
the trailer at Ms. Ellinger's property, the trailer was in Mr. Bennett's possession and was 
under his control to live in, to care for, etc. Mr. Bennett argued his case was similar to 
Henninger, where the court found once the defendant drove off in the vehicle it was in 
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h is control. Henninger, 130 Idaho at 641, 945 P .2d at 867 (noting that under the terms 
of the agreement, the dealership had "no further right to possession except to the extent 
that it would be entitled to repossess the vehicle upon default by terms of the security 
agreement."); (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.). 
In Henninger, the Idaho Court of Appeals was faced with the question of whether 
the defendant had committed theft by unauthorized control as provided in I.C. § 18-
2403(3), when the defendant failed to make payments on the installment contract for the 
pickup he purchased. Henninger, 130 Idaho at 640-42,945 P.2d at 866-868. In making 
its determination that there was not substantial competent evidence to convict 
Mr. Henninger of the crime alleged, the Court noted that when Mr. Henninger drove the 
pickup away from the dealership he was the owner of the vehicle and his control was 
authorized. Id. at 641-42, 945 P.2d at 867-868. The Court went on to conclude that 
absent a more explicit expression by the legislature that it intended to abandon the 
customary separation of criminal law and civil contract enforcement, theft by 
unauthorized control was not intended "to encompass possession by a debtor who, by 
defaulting on a payment, has become contractually obligated to return the collateral to 
the creditor" or that it "intended the theft statute to be a mechanism that would aid the 
repossession efforts of secured creditors." Id. at 642, 945 P.2d at 868. 
In the case at hand, the Court of Appeals found that Henninger was 
distinguishable because in Henninger, the car dealership relinquished "all the badges of 
ownership" to the defendant, whereas here "there was sufficient evidence that LeFave 
had not relinquished to Bennett 'all the badges of ownership,' but rather had explicitly 
retained both the title and his right to possession of the trailer in that Bennett was not to 
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move it without LeFave's assistance." (Opinion, pp.5-7 (emphasis added).) The Court 
then went on to find that because Mr. Bennett had not been given all the badges of 
ownership, his moving of the trailer could be criminal whereas Henninger's actions were 
not. (Opinion, p.7.) However, this comparison never actually resolves the question of 
whether Mr. Bennett had lawful possession of the trailer when it was moved. Clearly 
Mr. Bennett had lawful possession of the trailer prior to moving it. He could live in the 
trailer and use it how he saw fit. 
Furthermore, unlike Henninger, there was not even an agreement reserving the 
right for Mr. LeFave to repossess the vehicle upon default. (See Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.30, 
L.2.) Although it was agreed that the physical title would not be given to Mr. Bennett 
until he made full payment, there was nothing specifying that Mr. LeFave had a right to 
enter the defendant's property and regain control of the trailer or move the trailer to 
another location himself. (See Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.30, L.2.) Even if Mr. LeFave 
maintained some kind of possessory interest in the location of the trailer, his interest 
was not greater that Mr. Bennett's. In fact, both Mr. LeFave's and Mr. Bennett's 
interests in the location of the trailer were subject to the permission of the Ellingers, 
whose property the trailer was located on and whose permission Mr. Bennett had 
obtained to keep the trailer there. Therefore, Mr. Bennett's case is not distinguishable 
from Henninger as the Court of Appeals found because his possessory interest in the 
trailer was equal to or greater than that of Mr. LeFave. 
Finally, by finding that Mr. Bennett exceeded the scope of the "limited possessory 
rights" that he was granted, the Court of Appeals essentially found that Mr. Bennett was 
guilty of unauthorized control when Mr. Bennett was not charged with unauthorized 
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control nor was the jury instructed on the necessary elements. Compare I.C. § 18-2403 
(3) ("A person commits theft when he knowingly takes or exercises unauthorized control 
over, or makes an unauthorized transfer of an interest in, the property of another 
person, with the intent of depriving the owner thereof.") with I.C. § 18-2403(1) ("A 
person steals property and commits theft when ... he wrongfully takes, obtains or 
withholds such property from an owner thereof.") In its Opinion, the Court of Appeals 
shifted Mr. Bennett's conviction away from his failure to pay a debt to his removal of the 
trailer stating, "Bennett was not prosecuted simply for his failure to complete payments 
to LeFave, but for his action of removing the trailer from Ellinger's property in 
contravention of LeFave's explicit instructions." (Opinion, p.7.) By making this finding, 
the Court of Appeals was actually finding that Mr. Bennett exercised unauthorized 
control over the trailer without Mr. Bennett ever being charged with or the jury having 
ever being asked to find the necessary elements of unauthorized control under 
I.C. § 18-2403(3). Thus, the Court of Appeals invaded the province of the jury and 
found Mr. Bennett guilty of theft by unauthorized control when he was actually charged 
with straightforward theft. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals finding that Mr. Bennett "wrongfully" took the 
trailer because he exceeded the scope of the possession he was given is contradictory 
to the Court of Appeals' prior Opinion in Henninger and required the court find 
Mr. Bennett guilty of an offense he was not charged with. Mr. Bennett obtained 
possession of the trailer when Mr. LeFave dropped it off at the specified location and 
any possessory interest retained by Mr. LeFave was not superior to that of Mr. Bennett. 
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Therefore, the State failed to prove that Mr. Bennett unlawfully took or obtained the 
trailer. 
3. The Court Of Appeals' Finding That Mr. LeFave's Ownership Interest Was 
Superior To That Of Mr. Bennett's Is Contrary To Opinions By The Idaho 
Supreme Court And The Idaho Court Of Appeals 
The Court of Appeals finding that Mr. LeFave was the "owner" of the trailer rather 
than Mr. Bennett is also contrary to prior decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. Idaho code § 18-2402(6) and the jury instructions in this case 
define owner as "any person who has a right to possession thereof superior to that of 
the taker, obtainer or withholder." I.C. § 18-2402(6); (Jury Instruction No.15 (replacing 
"taker, obtainer or withholder" with "defendant").) Here, the Court of Appeals found that 
under the definition of owner contained in I.C. §18-2402(6), there was sufficient 
evidence to find that Mr. LeFave "possessed a superior right to possession given that 
he retained both title and sole control over the location of the trailer." (Opinion, p.8.) 
However, Mr. Bennett contends this analysis was contradictory to this Court's Opinion in 
State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 501 P.2d 727 (1972) as well as the Court of Appeals' 
Opinion in State v. Henninger, 130 Idaho 638, 945 P.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1997). 
In its' Opinion, the Court of Appeals found that here there was an explicit 
agreement that Mr. Bennett "would not receive title to the trailer until he had paid the full 
purchase price." (Opinion, p.8.) However, this finding ignores two things: 1) that 
Mr. LeFave testified that "the title" was to be delivered to Mr. Bennett after he completed 
payment, in other words the document of title, not necessarily title itself (Tr., p.30, 
Ls.20-23) and 2) the language in Jesser and § 28-2-401 (2) stating that title passes upon 
delivery of goods "despite any reservation of a security interest and even though a 
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document of title is to be delivered at a different time or place." See I.C. § 28-2-
401 (2); Jesser, 95 Idaho at 51, 501 P.2d at 735. 
Here, Mr. LeFave testified that "the title" was to be delivered to Mr. Bennett after 
he completed payment, in other words the document of title, not necessarily title itself. 
(Tr., p.30, Ls.20-23.) Therefore, there was not an explicit agreement regarding when 
title would pass as the Court of Appeals found, but rather an agreement as to when the 
document of title would be given to Mr. Bennett. (See Opinion, p.8.) 
Furthermore, Mr. LeFave delivered the trailer to Mr. Bennett at the beginning of 
this transaction; therefore, title had passed at that point and Mr. Bennett continued to 
make payment to Mr. LeFave after this occurred. (See, Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.30, L.2.) In 
Jesser, the Court noted that under the uniform commercial code, "title is deemed to 
pass to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance 
with to physical delivery of the goods, unless the parties explicitly agree otherwise." 
Jesser, 95 Idaho at 51, 501 P.2d at 735 (citing I.C. § 28-2-401 (2) which currently states 
that "[u]nless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place 
at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of 
the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and even though a document of 
title is to be delivered at a different time or place."). Therefore, by accepting partial 
payment for the trailer and moving the trailer to Mr. Bennett's property, under Jesser 
Mr. LeFave was transferring ownership of the trailer to Mr. Bennett. 
Additionally, in Henninger, the Court found that although it could legitimately be 
argued that a party holding a security interest in a property becomes the "owner" upon 
the defendant's default, this result was likely not the intention of the legislature because 
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it would render anyone who misses a payment on a secured credit purchase guilty of 
criminal conduct. Id. at 641, 945 P.2d at 867. Although here there was no evidence 
presented at trial establishing that Mr. LeFave even had a security interest in the trailer, 
even if he did, Mr. Bennett's default does not render Mr. LeFave's ownership interest 
superior to that of Mr. Bennett. (See Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.30, L.2.) 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals' finding that there was sufficient evidence for the 
jury to find that Mr. LeFave possessed a superior ownership interest is contrary to both 
Jesser and Henninger and the State failed to establish that Mr. LeFave's ownership 
interest in the trailer was superior to Mr. Bennett's. 
4. The Court Of Appeals' Finding Of Sufficient Evidence That Mr. Bennett 
Intentionally Deprived Mr. LeFave Of The Trailer Is Contrary To Prior 
Opinions By This Court 
In its Opinion, the Court of Appeals found Mr. Bennett's argument that there was 
insufficient evidence of his intent to deprive Mr. LeFave of the trial was "unavailing" 
because Mr. Bennett was never an "owner" of the trailer and Mr. Bennett's argument 
was based solely on this basis. (Opinoin, pp.8-9.) However the finding that Mr. Bennett 
possessed the intent to permanently deprive Mr. LeFave of the property is also contrary 
to prior decisions by this Court which have held that the intent to deprive the owner of 
their property must exist at the time of the wrongful taking. 
First, contrary to the Court of Appeals finding that Mr. Bennett's argument was 
based solely on the fact he never owned his trailer, Mr. Bennett also argued that his 
failure to pay for the trailer was insufficient to satisfy the intent element. (See Opinion, 
pp.8-9; Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.) In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Bennett argued that 
"the State failed to prove that Mr. Bennett wrongfully took the trailer with the intent to 
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deprive the owner of the property or to appropriate the property" and addressed the two 
theories the State presented regarding why this element was satisfied: because 
Mr. Bennett failed to pay for the trailer and because Mr. Bennett did not have 
permission to take the trailer. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.) Therefore, Mr. Bennett's 
argument was more than just he was the owner of the trailer therefore he could deprive 
the owner, it was also that his failure to pay was not sufficient to satisfy this element. 
(See Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.) This second argument was addressed further in 
Mr. Bennett's Reply Brief. (See Reply Brief, pp.1 0-12) 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals' the finding that Mr. Bennett possessed the 
intent to permanently deprive Mr. LeFave of the property is also contrary to prior 
decisions by this Court which have held that the intent to deprive the owner of their 
property must exist at the time of the wrongful taking. As Professor LeFave has noted, 
the defendant's conduct and his mental state must coincide for a larceny or theft to be 
completed. Wayne R. LeFave, Substantive Criminal Law, § 19.5(f) (2nd ed. 2003.) 
Thus, the taking and the intent to steal must concur or occur at the same time. Id. 
("[O]ne who finds lost or mislaid property and picks it up intending to return it to the 
owner, but who later decides to steal it, cannot be guilty of larceny; for the taking and 
asportation, on the one hand, and the intent to steal on the other, do not coincide.") 
Likewise, the Idaho Courts have also stated that the intent required to deprive the owner 
of his property "must exist at the time of the wrongful taking or stealing." State v. 
Bassett, 86 Idaho 277,385 P.2d 246 (1963). See a/so Jesser, 95 Idaho at 51,501 P.2d 
at 735. Therefore, at the time Mr. Bennett took the property, which according to the 
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Court of Appeals was when it was moved from Ms. Ellinger's property, Mr. Bennett had 
to possess the requisite intent to deprive Mr. LeFave. (See Opinion, pp.6-9.) 
Here, the State did not present any evidence that Mr. Bennett possessed the 
intent to deprive Mr. LeFave of the payment he was due under the contract at the time 
he moved the trailer. According to Ms. Ellinger, the trailer was placed on her property, 
after she gave Mr. Bennett permission to do so, in October/November and a month or 
two later, the trailer was moved. (Tr., p.82, L.16 - p.84, L.2.) Mr. LeFave only testified 
that he received a call stating the trailer was not at the property anymore and he went to 
investigate and several months later Mr. Bennett called. (Tr., p.32, L.10 - p.33, L.11.) 
It was after that call that Mr. LeFave sent Mr. Bennett the demand letter. (Tr., p.33, 
Ls.9-11, p.34, Ls.5-8.) Likewise, Mrs. LeFave remembered receiving a payment from 
Mr. Bennett, but could not remember when, stating 'The fall. That's about the extent of 
what I remember." (Tr., p.73, Ls.19-22.) Notably, Mr. LeFave admitted that Mr. Bennett 
did offer to pay for the trailer when he called requesting the title. (Tr., p.34, Ls.1-3; p.39, 
Ls.10-20.) 
Mr. Bennett's testimony also failed to demonstrate his intent to deprive 
Mr. LeFave. According to Mr. Bennett, the payment to Mrs. LeFave was made on 
November 17, 2004. (Tr., p.1 01, Ls.10-23.) Additionally, Mr. Bennett testified that he 
had already moved the trailer to a new location, with Mr. LeFave, prior to dropping off 
the money to Mrs. LeFave, and he moved to Washington immediately after giving the 
money to Mrs. LeFave. (Tr., p.111, L.22 - p.113, L.8.) He also testified that he called 
Mr. LeFave from Washington asking for the title on December 20, 2004, well after he 
had moved to Washington. (Tr., p.115, Ls.1-7.) 
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Furthermore, as argued above, by the time of the alleged taking, Mr. Bennett 
already had lawful possession of the trailer and was the owner. (See Supp. Tr., p.12, 
L.5 - p.13, L.16.) Mr. Bennett was lawfully in possession of the trailer once Mr. LeFave 
dropped the trailer off at the specified lot for his use. See Section I(C)(2) supra. 
Additionally, Mr. Bennett's ownership interest in the trailer was superior to Mr. LeFave's 
once the trailer was delivered. See Section I(C)(3) supra. Even if Mr. Bennett 
possessed the requisite intent to deprive Mr. LeFave of the property when he moved the 
trailer, he already had lawful possession of the trailer and had a superior ownership 
interest. 
Therefore, the State's evidence failed to prove that Mr. Bennett had the intent to 
steal the trailer and not continue to make payments, at the time he took the trailer and 
the Court of Appeals' Opinion regarding this issue is contrary to prior decisions by this 
Court requiring the intent to deprive the owner to exist at the time of the taking. 
D. If Mr. Bennett's Petition for Review Is Granted, Mr. Bennett Asks This Court To 
Find That The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support The 
JUry'S Verdict Finding Mr. Bennett Guilty Of Grand Theft 
In this case, the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove Mr. Bennett 
was guilty of grand theft because it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Bennett committed a theft by moving the trailer, which was already in his 
possession and which he had made at least one payment toward. An appellate court's 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is limited in scope. 
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 2001). The 
reviewing court will not set aside the judgment of conviction following a jury verdict, if 
"there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found 
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that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592,594,944 P.2d 727,729 
(Ct. App. 1997). 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court will conduct an 
independent review of the evidence in the record to determine whether a reasonable 
mind could conclude that each material element of the offense was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Willard, 129 Idaho at 828,933 P.2d at 117; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 
104, 822 P.2d at 1001. The Court will not substitute its views for that of the jury when 
determining "the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and 
the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Crawford, 130 Idaho at 595, 
944 P.2d at 730. Furthermore, the Court will consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution. Id. In State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 937 P.2d 960 
(Ct. App. 1997), it was noted that, "[eJvidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable 
trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of 
fact has been proved." Id. at 135, 937 P.2d at 961. 
Here, the dispute was contractual in nature and Mr. Bennett was not charged 
with theft by deception, theft by false pretenses, or theft by unauthorized control, by 
embezzlement, etc. but was simply charged with grand theft under the general portion 
of theft statute, and the instructions submitted to the jury only required the jury to find 
Mr. Bennett guilty of a general theft over $1,000. (See Jury Instructions Nos. 13, 17.) 
The elements of the crime of theft as charged in this case were: 
1. On or about October 30, 2004 
2. in the State of Idaho 
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3. the defendant William Lynn Bennett, wrongfully took property 
described as: at 1962 travel trailer, 
4. from an owner, and 
5. the defendant took the property with the intent to deprive an owner 
of the property or to appropriate the property. 
(Jury Instruction No. 13.) The thrust of the State's case was that Mr. Bennett committed 
theft when he moved the trailer to Washington without Mr. LeFave's permission. (Supp. 
Tr., p.11, L.10 - p.12, L.16.) However, this theory fails to support Mr. Bennett's 
conviction of grand theft on the following three elements: (1) that Mr. Bennett wrongfully 
took the property, because the property was in Mr. Bennett's possession so it could not 
be "wrongfully" taken by him; (2) that the property was taken from an owner, because 
Mr. Bennett had contracted with Mr. LeFave for the trailer and was ostensibly the owner 
of the trailer; and (3) that Mr. Bennett took the property with the intent to deprive the 
owner of the property or to appropriate the property, because Mr. Bennett did not have 
the requisite intent to deprive Mr. LeFave when he moved the trailer. Therefore, as 
discussed above in section (C) and incorporated herein by reference, Mr. Bennett 
contends the State failed to establish the material elements of the crime in this case to 
support his conviction. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bennett respectfully requests that this Court grant his Petition for Review. If 
granted, he asks this Court to vacate his conviction for grand theft with a persistent 
violator enhancement because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. 
DATED this 18th day of June, 2009. 
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